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"IF IT DIDN'T EXIST, IT WOULD HAVE To BE
INVENTED" -REVIVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
Jeffrey Lubbers*

With the demise of the Administrative Conference of the United
States ("ACUS") in October 1995, the federal government, for the first time
in nearly thirty years, lacks a center for advice, research, consensusbuilding, and information dissemination concerning administrative agency
practices and procedures.
The concept of an "administrative conference" goes back before the
1964 Administrative Conference Act,1 to the "temporary" administrative
23
conferences (of two years' duration) in the Eisenhower and
Kennedy3
Administrations. In each case the temporary conference recommended the

establishment of a permanent conference. 4 The Congress in 1964 heeded the
*

Fellow in Administrative Law and Visiting Professor of Law, Washington College of

Law, American University. Former Research Director, Administrative Conference of the United
States (1981-1995). J.D., University of Chicago. Portions of this article were included in remarks
at an ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Program, Privatizing ACUS and
its Alternatives, ABA Annual Meeting, Orlando, Florida (August 2, 1996). 1 would like to thank
Gary Edles and Charles Pou for their helpful contributions to this piece.
1.
Pub. L. No. 88-479, 78 Stat. 615 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-596 (1994)).
2.
The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure, created by Presidential
Memorandum on April 29, 1953. See Report of the Conference on Administrative Procedure
Called by the President of the United States on April 29, 1953 (undated but presumably 1955
because it contains President Eisenhower's reply, dated March 3, 1955) (on file with author).
3.
See Exec. Order No. 10,934, 26 Fed. Reg. 3233 (1961), "Establishing the Administrative
Conference of the United States," April 13, 1961, reprintedin S. DOC. NO. 24, Selected Reports of
the Administrative Conference of the United States, Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and
Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (1963) [hereinafter Selected Reports].
4.
The final action of the 1953-54 Eisenhower Conference was to adopt a resolution
recommending that a similar conference be established on a permanent basis. This history is
recounted in 1961-62 KENNEDY CONFERENCE, REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 6. Similarly, in 1962 the Chairman and Counsel Members of the Kennedy
Conference wrote a letter to the President recommending "the creation on a permanent footing of
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recommendation and enacted the Administrative Conference Act. With the

appointment of its first Chairman in late 1967, ACUS began its activities as
the government's central repository of advice and recommendations on
administrative law. After 27 years and over 200 recommendations, the
Conference's activities were cut short by the decision of the Approlriations
Committees of the 104th Congress to eliminate the agency's funding.
ACUS' structure was designed to produce a public/private
partnership by maximizing the joint participation of agency and outside
experts in administrative procedure. This "Conference" met together to
develop recommendations to the President, Congress, agencies, and the
courts with the help of a small permanent professional and support staff. Its

statutory charter provided for a maximum of 101 members (including a
presidentially-appointed Chairman and ten-member Council). 6 Every major
federal agency appointed at least one member, and the Conference Chairman
appointed distinguished private sector members who served without
compensation. The staff and budget remained small over the years. 7 In
1995, it had 19 employees and a budget of under $2 million-a minuscule
budget for a federal entity. By comparison, its counterpart in the judicial
branch, the Federal Judicial Center-created in the same year as ACUS with
only a slightly larger budget-had grown to have a budget ten times larger. 9
the Administrative Conference of the United States, to be composed of a counsel and an assembly."
Letter from E. Barrett Prettyman, Chairman to the President (Dec. 19, 1962) (on file with author).
5.
The story of the Conference's demise-including some earlier, but non-fatal,
appropriations difficulties with Congress-is well told in Gary J. Edles, Lessons from the
Administrative Conference of the United States, 2 EUR. PUB. L. 571 (1996), to be reprinted in
revised form as The Continuing Need For an Administrative Conference, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 101
(forthcoming 1998). For other recent discussions of the Administrative Conference, see Testimony
Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary on Admin. Law and Gov'tl Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary in Support of the Reauthorization of the Administrative Conference of the United States
[hereinafter Statement of Katzen et al.], reprinted in 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 649 (1994); Marshall J.
Breger, The Administrative Conference of the United States: A Quarter Century Perspective, 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 813 (1992); ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice Program:
The Administrative Conference of the U.S.-Where Do We Go From Here?, 8 COOLEY L. REV. 147
(1991); Charles Pou, Jr., The Administrative Conference: An "Auxiliary Precaution" of the
American System, 4 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAC. 57 (1990).
6.
See 5 U.S.C. § 593 (1994).
7.
There were proposals in the Carter Administration to transform ACUS into a much larger
operation, housing the Federal Register and all of the government's administrative law judges. See,
e.g., Larry Kramer, New 'Superagency' Proposed To Oversee Federal Regulation, WASH. POST,
Mar. 3, 1979, at A8.
8.
I cannot resist pointing out that ACUS' budget was about .0008 of the cost of one new
submarine. See John Mintz, Navy Floats $2.4 Billion Attack Sub; Without an Enemy, Seawolf
Draws Fire, WASH. POST, July 19, 1997, at Al.
9.
Congress appropriated $40,000 for the initial operations of the Federal Judicial Center
("FJC") in fiscal year 1968, and $300,000 for fiscal year 1969. See 1968 ANN. REP. DIRECTOR OF
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10
ACUS sponsored considerable research in administrative law,
leveraging a small research budget to hire academic consultants who
sacrificed market-based fees for the sake of enhanced peer review, access to
government decision makers, and a chance to affect agency activities. Their
research reports became the basis for formal recommendations, drafted in
the open with substantial public participation by committees of members.
Semi-annual plenary sessions considered committee recommendations for
adoption. Adopted recommendations were published in the FederalRegister
and Code of Federal Regulations,11 widely disseminated around the
government, and actively promoted by the Conference's staff. Due to the
consensus-based process used by ACUS, it managed to achieve a high rate of
implementation for its (non-binding) recommendations. 12
ACUS also
sponsored basic research (e.g., on agency caseload
statistics), and published
13
numerous guides, sourcebooks, and manuals for agency (and public) use.
Its Chairman and professional
staff regularly presented testimony and advice
14
legislation.
pending
on

THE ADMIN. OFFICE U.S. CTS. 41. The original appropriation ceiling for ACUS was $250,000 in
1968. See Administrative Conference Appropriations Ceiling Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat.
615 (1964). In 1969, the ceiling was raised to $450,000. See Administrative Conference
Appropriations Ceiling Act, Pub. L. No. 91-164, 83 Stat. 446 (1969); 1969 ACUS ANN. REP. 1 &
n.2 (1970). In 1994 ACUS' budget authority was $1.8 million and the FJC's was $18,828,000. See
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL

YEAR 1996 app. at 939, 950.
10. See, e.g., Reauthorization of the Administrative Conference of the Unites States:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. 38 (1995) (statement of Peter M. Shane, Dean of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law)
[hereinafter Statement of Shane] ("Since its inception, ACUS has produced a steady stream of law
reform analysis of the very highest quality. Under distinguished leaders of both parties ... ACUS
has maintained an unblemished reputation for sound, independent, evenhanded judgment in the
interests of administrative fairness, efficiency, and effectiveness.").
11.
The latest full compilation was in 1 C.F.R. § 305 (1993). This set is now available
online at <http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/acustoc.html>.
See also 60 Fed. Reg.
56,312 (1995) for a notice that lists all of the ACUS recommendations and statements, together with
citations for the Federal Register documents in which they were published. Many depository
libraries also have copies of ACUS' annual volumes of Reports and Recommendations.
12. ACUS estimated that about three-fourths of its recommendations were adopted at least in
part. See Statement of Katzen et al., supra note 5, at 665.
13. See, e.g., THE MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (3d ed. 1993); A GUIDE TO
FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING (2d ed. 1991); AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO THE GOVERNMENT
IN THE SUNSHINE ACT (1978); FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK (2d ed.
1992); NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (2d ed. 1995); SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY
USE OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1987). All of these books were published

and sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office.
14. See, e.g., Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 343 Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1995) (statement of Thomasina V. Rogers, ACUS Chair); Regulatory Flexibility Amendments Act of
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In recent years, ACUS had been in the forefront of evaluating
regulatory reform initiatives and in encouraging agency use of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR"). The Administrative Conference's work in
promoting ADR in the government included applied research, giving policy
advice to agencies, educating agency personnel, offering legislative drafting
and technical aid to Congress, and providing individual agencies with
systems design and other implementation help.
In the 1980s, ACUS
developed theoretical underpinnings-helping agencies begin to think in
terms of adapting unfamiliar ADR concepts to their various activities, or
even creating new ones, such as negotiated rulemaking.15 ACUS then took a
lead role in drafting, and getting introduced, the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act 16 and Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 17 and then working (with
others, notably the. American Bar Association) to obtain passage of these
laws in 1990. The laws encouraged ADR use, mandated appointment of
dispute resolution specialists in each agency, and named the Administrative
Conference as the lead agency for implementation. After enactment of the
Acts, ACUS worked to build agencies' capacity to implement them-it
organized and maintained a roster of neutrals; helped newly appointed
agency dispute resolution specialists develop policies and start new ADR
programs; and brought them together in interagency working groups, staffed
by the Administrative Conference, to present materials,I seminars, and
training that no single agency would have done on its19own. 1
Despite a great deal of support from the bar, members of Congress

1993: Hearings on the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1993) (statement of Jeffrey S.

Lubbers, ACUS Research Director); Letter from Gary J. Edles, ACUS Gen. Counsel to Staff Dir.,
Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (June 2, 1992), reprintedin 138 CONG. REC.
S9353 (July 1, 1992).
15.
See generally Charles E. Grassley & Charles Pou, Jr., Congress, the Executive Branch,
and the Dispute Resolution Process, 1 J. DiSP. RESOL. 1 (1992).
16.
Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583). The Act was

permanently reauthorized and amended by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996).
17.

Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70).

The Act was

permanently reauthorized by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104320, § 11, 110 Stat. 3870, 3873 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 569 (1996)).
18.

See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN,

ACUS,

TOWARD IMPROVED AGENCY DISPUTE

RESOLUTION: IMPLEMENTING THE ADR ACT (February 1995) (Report to Congress); OFFICE OF
THE CHAIRMAN, ACUS, BUILDING CONSENSUS IN AGENCY RULEMAKING: IMPLEMENTING THE
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING ACT (October 1995) (Report to Congress).
19.
The ABA, and especially its Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, was
historically a strong supporter of ACUS. It supported ACUS' creation in the 1960s and it was

always solicitous of its role within the government. In 1989, the House of Delegates adopted a
resolution supporting "the reauthorization of [ACUS] and the provision of funds sufficient to permit
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from both parties, 20 the academic community, 2 1 and unusual letters of
support from Justices Breyer and Scalia, 22 ACUS ran afoul of budget cutters
in the appropriations subcommittees and rather suddenly, after an
appropriations conference committee failed to follow the Senate's earlier
floor vote to restore its budget, 23 had to close down in one month (October
ACUS to continue its role as the government's in-house advisor and coordinator of administrative
procedural reform."
DELEGATES 35.

ABA, 1989 MIDYEAR MEETING, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF

20. See examples cited in Edles, supra note 5, at 604 n. 144. One of the more remarkable
testimonials came after-the-fact by Representative Steny H. Hoyer (D. Md.) who was Chair of the
Appropriations Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service and General Government in the 103rd
Congress and ranking minority member in the 104th:
As you know, initially I was not a proponent of the Conference and
felt that its work could be done either in the agencies themselves or in the
private sector. However, I became convinced that the Conference did, in fact,
perform a very valuable and important service....
Unfortunately, as you are well aware, the Republican Leadership was
very desirous of having notches on its gun barrel of agencies that it had
eliminated.... As a result, for a very small savings we have given up a very
valuable agency supported by a broad bi-partisan coalition of individuals who
know of the quality of its work.
Letter from Rep. Steny H. Hoyer to Thomasina V. Rogers, last Chair of ACUS (Nov. 1, 1995).
21. See, e.g., Statement of Shane, supra note 10, at 4 ("I can tell you that universities, think
tanks, and even Congressional staffs could not hope to fulfill ACUS's current ,role."). See also
Statement of Katzen, et al., supra note 5, at 687 (statement of Professor Thomas 0. Sargentich). In
1993, a letter in support of ACUS was signed by 97 law school deans and professors of
administrative law. See Letter from Professor Ronald M. Levin, Washington University in St.
Louis School of Law to Rep. Steny H. Hoyer (Sept. 10, 1993) (on file with author).
22. See Edles, supra note 5, at 603 n. 143. Justice Scalia had served as ACUS Chairman
from 1972-74. For a description of Justice (then-Judge) Breyer's activities as a member of ACUS,
see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Justice Stephen Breyer: Purveyor of Common Sense in Many Forums, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 775 (1995).
23.
See Amendment No. 2249, 141 CONG. REC. S1l,547 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1995); see also

Letter from Sens. William S. Cohen, John Glenn, Charles E. Grassley, Orrin Hatch, Howell
Heflin, Herb Kohl, Carl Levin, and William V. Roth, Jr. to Sen. Richard Shelby, Chairman,
Treasury, Postal Serv. and Gen. Gov't Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations (Sept. 8,
1995) (reiterating "strong support for the Senate position providing [full] funding" for ACUS).
Notwithstanding this letter, Senator Shelby did not support the Senate's position in the conference
committee.
The Senate's overall support for ACUS was also reflected in the fact that the three major
regulatory reform bills pending in the Senate at that time (S. 291, S.343, and S. 1001) mandated
studies by ACUS of the implementation of the legislation. The Governmental Affairs Committee,
in reporting out S.343, wrote:
Because ACUS is comprised of respected experts and practitioners

representing a wide range of perspectives and interests, and has a record of
developing unbiased, practical solutions to regulatory problems, the Committee
believes that this agency is well suited to producing the studies and
recommendations needed to fulfill the intent... [of the bill].
REGULATORY REFORM ACT OF 1995, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, S. REP. NO. 104-88, at 57 (1995). Indeed, two years after ACUS' closing, proposed
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1995). 24 Its resources and archives were distributed rather hurriedly, its
members left hanging, and its staff unceremoniously "riffed." 25 Its functions
went unassigned by the Congress-not surprisingly leaving
a fragmented
2
approach to administrative law reform and resource sharing.
To be sure, a few aspects of ACUS' functions have been picked up
by other agencies. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has
stepped up its involvement in agency ADR efforts. 27 It, along with the
Department of Justice and the General Services Administration, has each
hired a former ACUS staff attorney to help with administrative-law-related
issues. With the backing of Presidential Executive Orders, OMB's Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") has served as acoordinating
2
body on regulatory issues (albeit with an "Administration" point of view).
A rather unstructured Regulatory Working Group, also chaired by-the OIRA
Administrator, 29 has undertaken occasional efforts to coordinate agency
regulatory activities. The National Performance Review, working for the
Vice President, and once thought to be a temporary management review
effort, has also continued to look at "reinvention" initiatives and
management reforms. 30
legislation still contains assignments to ACUS. See Health Care Liability Reform and Quality
Assurance Act of 1997, S. 886, 105th Cong. § 111(b) (requiring the Attorney General to consult
with ACUS in developing guidelines for state-based alternative dispute resolution mechanisms);
Equal Access to Justice Reform Amendments of 1998, S. 1613, 105th Cong. § l(g) (mandating that
ACUS report to Congress on fee awards in administrative proceedings).
24. Because of the historical importance of these unusual letters, I have reproduced them in
the Appendix.
25. I.e., subject to removal via a "reduction in force."
26. For example, when Congress reauthorized the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act in
1996, the Conference's key role of promotion of ADR under the 1990 Act was assigned to an
unnamed "agency designated by, or the interagency committee designated or established by the
President." Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 4, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996). The provision that also reauthorized
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act also contained a similar provision. See id. § 11.
27. Among other things, the FMCS now maintains the "ADR Reading Room" created and
maintained by ACUS, and has taken over sponsorship of the ACUS Interagency ADR Working
Groups, now called the Federal ADR Network. See Deborah Schick Laufer, Whither FederalADR?
Here To Stay!, NIDR NEWS (Nov./Dec. 1996), at 11.
28.
For a report on OIRA's recent activities, see OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, MORE BENEFITS FEWER
BURDENS-CREATING A REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT WORKS FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, A
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 (1996).
29. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993). The membership of the RWG does
not include representatives of independent regulatory agencies, although representatives have been
allowed to attend upon request. The members are listed in OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, REGULATORY PLANNING AND
REVIEW, app. B, reprintedin 59 Fed. Reg. 24,293 (1994).
30.
As Vice President Gore recently wrote, "[E]ven before the second inauguration, President
Clinton and I called the new Cabinet to Blair House to give them their reinvention marching
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In the private sector there are also organizations that at least partially
share ACUS' interest in administrative law reform. Most obvious, of
course, is the ABA's Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice. The Federal Bar Association and D.C. Bar have similar but
smaller committees.
In the academic world, American University's
Washington College of Law ("WCL") has helped preserve the ACUS legacy
in an accessible place, by agreeing to maintain the ACUS archive (i.e., that
portion not mandated for inclusion into the National Archives) in its new law
library. 3 1 The WCL also has a Law and Government Program and has
recruited two former senior ACUS officials to affiliate with it. Other private
sector organizations, foundations, and think tanks in Washington also have
an interest in government procedures, ranging from the National Academy of
Public Administration, Urban Institute, Brookings Institution, American
Enterprise Institute, and Heritage Foundation.
Obviously, none of these agencies or private organizations is, or
-ould be, clones of ACUS. They all lack one or more of the following
attributes of ACUS: (1) the public/private membership structure, (2) direct
ties to both the President and the Congress (including the ability to accept
special assignments with or without budget augmentation), 32 (3) a
determination to maintain a non-partisan, unbiased approach to issues, (4) a
permanent career staff that could organize research and implement activities
and serve as a central repository for administrative law and related expertise,
(5) the ability to attract the participation of federal judges, or (6) an
exclusive focus on administrative procedure.

orders." Al Gore, Introduction to "Blair House Papers," National Performance Review, Jan. 1997,
at viii.
The National Performance Review did, however, work closely with ACUS on
administrative law matters and its leadership wrote in support of ACUS' continued funding. See

Letter from Elaine Kamarck, Senior Policy Advisor to the Vice President to Rep. Steny H. Hoyer
(Mar. 7, 1994) ("Among the agencies I encountered for the first time was ACUS, and I was much
impressed with its work. . . . We look forward to continuing to use the unique expertise and
consensus-building capabilities of ACUS in bringing about the management efficiencies and
administrative improvements of the NPR.").
31.
For information contact:
Law Library, Washington College of Law, American
University, 4801 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20016; (202) 274-4330.
32. See supra note 26 for examples. In addition, Congress specifically asked ACUS to study
and make recommendations for reform of the Federal Aviation Administration civil penalty program
in Pub. L. No. 101-370, 104 Stat. 451 (1990).
The ultimate ACUS recommendations were
incorporated into Pub. L. No. 102-345, 106 Stat. 923 (1992). See Edles, supra note 5, at 593-94.
Congress also, in 1978, mandated an ACUS study of the FTC's Trade Regulation Rulemaking

provisions in Pub. L. No. 93-637 (1974). See Statement of Katzen et al., supra note 5, at 671 n.87.
Also, the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1994), and the Government in the
Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(g) (1976), required agencies to consult with ACUS before issuing
regulations. See Statement of Katzen et al., supra note 5, at 671 n.88.

ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

But ACUS also had some drawbacks: a somewhat unwieldy
structure, inflexible bureaucratic responsibilities (personnel and procurement

restrictions, annual budget/appropriation cycles, and a myriad of reporting
requirements) that come with being a federal agency (and are especially
burdensome for small agencies), and the buffeting that inevitably goes on
with changes in the control of Congress and the White House.
' Still, as the title of this piece indicates, many of ACUS' supporters
argued that ACUS was needed "now more than ever" and would be needed
again.3 4 So it may be appropriate to consider several different options for
recreating an ACUS-like entity to resume the coordination of the federal
administrative law and its reform.

OPTION 1: RESUSCITATE ACUS

The Administrative Conference Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-96, was not
repealed. If Congress wished, it could simply reauthorize ACUS and
appropriate funds. The President would presumably have to nominate a new
Chairman and appoint a new Council, and the agency would have to start
over.
But as a former ACUS General Counsel has observed, "In a climate
of government retrenchment, ACUS is not likely simply to be re-established.35
Rather, to employ the jargon of the day, it would have to be 'reinvented.'"
He went on to sketch a possible vision of an acceptable "reinvented"
Conference, using the extant Administrative Conference Act as the
foundation:
There is no reason why employees from other agencies (or even
the private sector) could not augment a small ACUS staff on a
temporary basis, with their salaries paid by their employing
entities.
The existing statute already permits this type of
arrangement and, for a number of years, ACUS had an active
'visiting executive' program that allowed a number of talented
government employees to join the ACUS staff for temporary
33. Statement of Katzen, et al., supra note 5, at 677 (statement of Thomas M. Susman
entitled "Now More Than Ever:
Reauthorizing the Administrative Conference, Reforming
Regulation and Reinventing Government").
34. As former Counsel to Vice President Bush and President Reagan put it, avoiding the
cliche, "My guess is that if Congress terminates ACUS now, it will have to recreate it some time in
the future, at considerable extra expense." Reauthorizationof the Administrative Conference of the
United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercialand Admin. Laws of the Comm. of the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 33 (May 11, 1995) (statement of C. Boyden Gray, Council Member,
ACUS).
35.

Edles, supra note 5, at 609.
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periods. ACUS might even be authorized to have a formal
affiliation with a law school, whose students and faculty could
assist in conducting research and drafting recommendations. If
need be, a law school, or consortium of law schools and schools of
public administration, might even
provide financial or logistical
36
support for ACUS's operations.
Given the passage of enough time, it is still quite possible that a
future Congress will recognize the error of the 104th and breathe new life
into the Administrative Conference Act. Until that time it is advisable to
think of other options for reviving its needed activities in another form.
OPTION 2: CREATE AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
If the functions of the Administrative Conference were to be revived
in an existing department or agency, the leading contender would be the
Department of Justice. The Department, of course, is the legal affairs center
of the government and the Office of the Associate Attorney General already
contains the Office of Information and Privacy, charged with overseeing
agency implementation of the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act,
and a small Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution. In addition, the Legal
Education Institute, which trains federal lawyers in,
among other things,
37
administrative law, is housed within the Department.
There also is some precedent for lodging the responsibility in the
Department. Pursuant to the terms of the Executive Order creating it, the
Kennedy Temporary Conference received research and staff support from
the Department's Office of Administrative Procedure.
After the temporary
conference ended its operations in 1963, that small office continued to
perform some research and statistics-gathering activities on administrative
proceedings until ACUS was activated in 1968.
Proposed structure: Probably the most efficient and effective means
would be an "Advisory Committee on Administrative Procedure" established
36. Id.
37. ACUS lawyers regularly participated in LEI's administrative law courses as instructors.
38. See Exec. Order No. 10,934, supra note 3, § 5. The Office of Administrative Procedure
was created as a unit within the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, in 1957. See Att'y
Gen. Order 142-57, 22 Fed. Reg. 998 (1957), reprinted in 1957 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE at v. Its creation had been recommended by the Eisenhower
Temporary Conference. See supra note 2. Its primary activity was to collect and publish statistics
on agency proceedings. See 1957 and 1958 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE at v.
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by the Attorney General. Recommendations from the Committee would be
made to the Attorney General, who would determine whether to forward
them to Congress or other agencies as appropriate.
Alternatively,
recommendations could also be made directly to the agencies and/or
Congress, without AG approval. My suggested model would reduce the size
of the Committee from the ACUS -model to forty-five 39 with three
subcommittees: Adjudication and Dispute Resolution, Rulemaking and
Regulation, and Governmental Processes and Oversight (which would
include judicial review issues).
Membership: i would begin with a ratio of twenty-five government
members to twenty non-government members. 40 The Attorney General
would select the non-government members with the government members
selected by agencies in the same way as was done with ACUS. The
Attorney General would select the agencies to be represented-with some
requirement of rotation among agencies and with some requirement that
independent . agencies be represented. She would also appoint the Committee
Chair from among the government members and the chairs of the three
subcommittees.
The Chair would preside over plenary meetings. The
Attorney General would receive recommendations on membership issues
from a full-time Executive Director. For continuity's sake, she would select
the Executive Director who would be a career SES member within the
41
Department of Justice.
Staff. The permanent staff would be minimal. I would suggest the
following: Executive Director (SES Level), Deputy Director (GS-15 level),
Staff Attorney (GS-12-14 level), Staff Assistant (GS-8-9). This skeletal staff
housed within DOJ, could be supplemented by Visiting Executives (like
ACUS was able to attract for 1-2 year stints) and detailees (for shorter
stints). The staff would support Committee activities, provide clearinghouse
assistance on administrative procedure issues, and promote implementation
of Committee recommendations.

39.
ACUS' statute allows up to 101 members. See 5 U.S.C. § 593 (1994). The 1962
Temporary Conference had 88 members. See Selected Reporls, supra note 3, at 2. In my
experience, the large membership was not particularly costly but it did require more staff attention
and created an unwieldy appearance. If the Committee were placed in an existing agency, its size
should probably be reduced.
40.
This follows the example of the ACUS model which also created a slight predominance of
government members, partly I believe because it was thought that the non-government members,
individually, would be able to devote a bit more energy and intellectual capital to the enterprise.

See 5 U.S.C. § 593(b)(6).
41.

This would guarantee the Executive Director some degree of tenure in the SES, but would

allow the Attorney General to transfer him to other positions in the Department.
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Budget: The proposed budget could be limited to about $650,000.
(E.g., $325,000, for staff salaries and benefits, $100,000 for overhead;
$60,000 for membership support [travel and committee meeting expenses];
$100,000 for research contracts, and $65,000 for publications.) Some of the
funds could likely be attracted from other agencies.
Status within DOJ: A crucial attribute to making the Advisory
Committee model work is providing for independent preparation of
recommendations to. the Attorney General. The Executive Director should
report directly to either the Deputy AG or Associate AG. Some sort of
clearance/approval process would be developed to approve new projects
recommended by the Executive Director, but after that the Committee,
subcommittees and consultants should be allowed leeway to develop
recommendations as ACUS did. 42 As with ACUS, there would presumably
be considerable self-generated incentives to come up with a defensible,
persuasive product at that point. Of course, the Advisory Committee would
be subject to the openness requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act.4 3

OPTION 3: SIMILAR TO OPTION 2, ExCEPT PLACED IN GENERAL
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

There would be several advantages to situating the Advisory
Committee on Administrative Procedure in the General Services
Administration ("GSA"). First, GSA, although an executive branch agency,
has a much lower level of involvement with policy matters (with less of an
Administration perspective) than the Department of Justice. Second, GSA
already has numerous government-wide, apolitical oversight responsibilities
and already has two related administrative law functions:
it has
responsibility for Federal Advisory Committee Act oversight 44 and also
houses the Regulatory Information Service Center which, among other
things, organizes and publishes the semi-annual Unified Agenda of Federal
42. For a good description of the process used by ACUS to develop its recommendations, see
Breger, supra note 5, at 825-28. See also Edles, supra note 5, at 583 ("ACUS never attempted to
dictate the results of consultant research but consultant products were subjected to an interactive
peer review process . .
").
43.
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982). ACUS was also subject to FACA and had few problems
operating within its strictures.
44. The Act vests the coordination function to the President and the OMB Director, but the
function was transferred to GSA by Exec. Order No. 12,024, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,445 (1977). The
function is now performed by the GSA Office of Administration, Committee Management
Secretariat.
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Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions.45 Third, placement in GSA would be
more likely to allow participation by federal judges who might feel it
inappropriate to advise the Department of Justice because of its role as the
government's litigator. Offsetting these advantages, however, is a very big
disadvantage: GSA clearly lacks the clout the Justice Department enjoys. It
would probably be more difficult to attract high-level participation in
Committee activities or sufficient attention to Committee recommendations
without the Attorney General's imprimatur.
Moreover the GSA
Administrator is normally chosen for managerial acumen and has historically
not been involved or interested in administrative law reform or regulatory
procedure issues.

OPTION

4: PRIVATIZATION IN AN EXISTING WELL-FINANCED ENTITY

As an alternative to reviving ACUS within the government, an
existing private entity (American Bar Association, National Academy of
Public Administration, The Brookings Institution, Urban Institute or
American Enterprise Institute) could be approached with a plan to recreate
the "Conference" aspect of ACUS-modeled perhaps on the smaller
"Advisory Committee" described in Option 2. A part-time Conference
Chair and full-time Executive Director could be appointed to direct the
activities of the Conference, which would operate loosely within the
organization. Recommendations might be made to a Board of Directors or
equivalent (e.g., the ABA's Board of Governors). Funding would come
from the organization's budget, foundations, federal research grants, book
sales, and training fees. Corporate funding might also be considered,
although the risks of actual or perceived bias would obviously counsel
caution in that area.
The overriding weakness of this option is that the non-government
nature of the entity would inevitably reduce the stature and official nature of
the recommendations. A related worry is that this privatized Conference
might also inevitably be viewed as reflecting the political or policy
orientation of the parent entity. The real strength of ACUS was that it was
not only in the government, it was the government. A recommendation
emanating from ACUS was inevitably referred to by headline writers as

45. For more information, see Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and
Deregulatory Actions, 62 Fed. Reg. 21,406 (1997).
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"Federal Panel recommends X. "46 This not only added the gravitas with
which all participants approached the issues, it made its recommendations
more influential, especially with "member" agencies.
Moreover, the
participation of the government members was intragovernmental. It was
clearly official business for the assistant general counsel of the Department
of Agriculture to grab a cab and spend several hours participating as an
ACUS Committee member. On the other hand, the ability of such officials
to take time to travel to and participate in bar activities, for example, is
clouded.4 7
Nevertheless there is some precedent for such an effort within the
bar association. In the 1970s, the ABA's Section of Administrative Law (as
it was then named) did organize the Center for Administrative Justice.
According to the original proposal for the Center made in 1972, although the
Center was not intended to duplicate the sort of applied research
48
recommendations that ACUS specialized in, it was supposed to maintain an
administrative law library and "provide training opportunities for those
engaged or interested in the administrative decision-making process in the
federal and local governments, assemble and disseminate information in this
area, conduct and support research projects, both theoretical and empirical,
46. See, e.g., Tort Claims Exception Repeal Tabled By Blue Ribbon Panel, 36 FOOD CHEM.
NEWS, Apr. 4, 1994; Cass Peterson, Agency Calls for Harmonizing Laws on Protection of WhistleBlowers, WASH. POST, June 11, 1987, at A21.
47. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, Subject: Participation in Bar
Activities by Justice Department Employees, to Department of Justice Attorneys, Mar. 27, 1997, at
2 ("Ordinarily bar activities should not be conducted at the expense of the government in terms of
time or money. . . . Occasionally, when the work of a bar committee is closely related to a
employee's official responsibilities, the Department may determine that an employee may serve on
that committee in his or her official capacity as the representative of the Department."). See
generally Lisa G. Lerman, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono: Public Service by Public Servants,
19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1141, 1192-1208 (1991) (describing criminal statutes and agency regulations

governing "outside activities" of employees).
48. As the first ACUS Chairman, Professor Jerre Williams, stated, in lauding the creation of
this Center in the ABA:
Certain limitations in [ACUS] and its functions should be noted. The
most important is that its activities relate solely to the federal government. A

second limitation is that a majority of the members of the Conference must be
government officials. While this is a valuable and proper limitation for this
organization, because it means that the government itself is undertaking reform,
the Conference nevertheless for this reason remains a government agency and
this limitation must be frankly recognized. A third possible limitation upon the
Conference is that, to maintain congressional and Presidential backing it must
be specific and precise in much of its activities. This means that there is less
room for general scholarship or "radical" inquiry.
Jerre S. Williams, A National Institute of Justice and the Administrative Process, NAT'L CENTER
FOR ST. CTS 114, 120-21 (undated).
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in order to illuminate the dark areas of the subject, and to provide consulting
and drafting services to governmental units of agencies." 4 9 The Center was
established and did some worthwhile work 5° before going out of business due
to funding difficulties in the early 1980s.
OPTION 5: CREATE A

NEW PRIVATE ACUS

If adequate start-up funds and a prestigious Chair could be attracted,
a private Conference on Administrative Procedure might be viable. Of
course without an adequate "endowment" from a respected foundation,
funding problems would likely be more acute in a start-up organization, and
the lure of corporate sponsorship correspondingly greater.
It should be noted here that the Washington Post recently reported
that staff members from the Office of Technology Assessment (a larger
congressional agency that also lost its funding about the same time as did
ACUS) have succeeded ("after six months of often frustrating efforts") in
obtaining donated office space and a $50,000 grant from an anonymous
donor as seed money for an Institute for Technology Assessment. 5 '
OPTION 6: TRY A ONE YEAR REVIVAL

As a short term experimental step, given the difficulty of a true
revival-at least while the appropriators who failed to appreciate ACUS'
value are still in charge-it might be advisable to try a low-budget temporary
ACUS in an academic setting. One way to try this would be for a law
school to sponsor an "Administrative Law Plenary Session" in 1998 or 1999.
As a foundation for such a setting, the Dean could appoint a group of
volunteers, some perhaps drawn from ACUS' most recent membership, to
identify the most pressing administrative law issues in today's government.
For instance, many new laws were passed in 1995-96 affecting the
administrative process. 52 Committees such as the ones suggested above in
49. Proposal for Center for Administrative Justice, Apr. 24, 1972, at 5, quoted in Williams,
supra note 48, at 121.
50. For example, see the Center's influential empirical study of the social security appeals
process, JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1978).

51. An Agency's Private Return, WASH. POST, May 6, 1996, at F19. No listing for the
Institute was found in the Washington phone directory, however.
52. See, e.g., Recent Developments: Regulatory Reform & the 104th Congress, 49 ADMIN.
L. REV. 95 (1997) (discussing congressional review of agency regulations, the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, and the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995).
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Option 1 could be formed to discuss these issues, develop reports, and draft
and circulate recommendations to ready them for a Plenary Session. If
properly organized and staffed'with faculty and student 'assistance, such a
Conference would at least continue the chain (unbroken from 1968 to 1995)
of ACUS recommendations to Congress and the agencies on administrative
law reform.

CONCLUSION

I believe it is only a matter of time before Congress and the
President recognize this country's need for objective, non-partisan expertise
on the crucial, but not always politically "sexy," issues of administrative
procedure implementation and reform. I also, not surprisingly, believe an
"administrative conference," as reflected in the Eisenhower and Kennedy
"temporary conferences" and as enacted by the Administrative Conference
The three main attributes of this model-a
Act, is basically sound.
public/private partnership, an entity that is a part of the government, and one
with at least a small staff to follow up and encourage real-world
implementation of recommended reforms-are of great importance to its
practical success. I have tried to present alternatives to tle stand-alone,
independent agency model that proved to be too precarious to withstand a
politicized appropriations cycle. I have also suggested possible streamlining
changes. Finally, if the in-house approach proves to be unrealistic for a
while, I suggest ways of keeping the idea (and the momentum built up by
ACUS for almost thirty years) alive in the private sector. However it may
happen, having an independent, expert entity to conduct research, provide
consensus-based recommendations, and assist Congress and agencies on
matters of administrative process is an idea whose time will come again.

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

APPENDIX

Justice Breyer Letter

[Ariz. St. L.J.

30:147]

REVIVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE

163

ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

30:147]

REVIVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE

165

APIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL

Justice Scalia Letter

[Ariz. St. L.J.

30:147]

REVIVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE

167

